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Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and
the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the quantitative
strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly
on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the main factors determining the optimal level of
intellectual property (IP) protection. We are especially interested in how
optimal protection should change as the size of the economy grows. There
is a large literature that explores the qualitativeaspects of optimal IP policy,
and a signicant empirical literature that attempts to measure such things
as the value of patents. There is, however, little connection between the
two. Our goal is to use a relatively standard model of IP, based on that of
Grossman and Lai [2004], and examine the policy implications of existing
quantitative ndings.
To do this we proceed in three steps; rst we use the model to derive the
optimal IP policy as a function of measurable parameters and the size of
the market, second we use available estimates to calibrate those parameters
and quantify changes in market size, nally we put everything together to
obtain the implications for optimal policy.
Innovations are introduced when they become protable. Protability of
an innovation depends upon three factors: the initial cost of discovery, the
elasticity of demand, and the size of the market; all these elements vary
widely and unsystematically across innovations. We focus primarily on
market size as it is easier to measure than the other two and it has grown
steadily and substantially since current patent and copyright legislation was
rst adopted. Notice that, by determining market power, IP policies affect
the relevant elasticity of demand.
Theory suggests that optimal policy involves a trade-off between increas-
ing the monopolistic distortion on inframarginal ideas, and increasing the
number of usable ideas by innovating at the margin. As the scale of the
market increases, depending on elasticity of the total demand for innovative
goods it may be desirable to give up some of the additional ideas in ex-
change for reduction of monopoly across the broad variety of inframarginal
ideas that will be produced anyway. In this case the optimal policy should
reduce the length of protection as the scale of the market increases. Our
analysis shows that this is the empirically relevant case.
We utilize a standard model in which IP protection is socially benecial.
1
Ideas are created subject to a xed cost and are not appropriable per-se.
There are many possible ideas yielding different private returns  dened
as the ratio of expected monopoly revenue to cost of creation in a market of
unit size. We focus on the case in which the private return is proportional
to the social return to an idea. This model is related to a series of papers
by Grossman and Helpman [1991, 1994, 1995] studying innovation in a
1We have examined the shortcomings of the standard model in Boldrin and Levine
[1999, 2002, 2004, 2005] where we argue that IP is not generally socially benecial.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2
Dixit-Stiglitz framework. It is most closely related, however, to Grossman
and Lai [2004]. Both they and we show that as the total monopoly revenue
function has increasing (decreasing) elasticity, then optimal protection lo-
cally decreases (increases). From a theoretical perspective, their approach
differs from ours in two respects. First, where we use a static analysis, they
embed the static model in a dynamic setting by treating costs and prots as
time-ows, and examining balanced growth paths. Since they have already
provided this interpretation, we simply note that this procedure is equally
valid for our model. Second, their model uses a production function ap-
proach to the creation of new ideas. That is, ideas are of homogeneous
quality, and are produced using a constant returns technology with human
capitaland laboras inputs. We use a disaggregatedmodelin whichideas are
heterogeneous both in their quality and in their cost of creation. The latter
allows us to show that the elasticity of the total monopoly revenue function
depends on the distribution of private returns from ideas. The latter turns
out to be a useful tool for quantitative analysis, as it can be estimated from
available data. This, together with the characterization of the optimal policy
mentioned above, is the bottom line of the theoretical section.
In the empirical part, then, our goal is to measure whether the elasticity
of total monopoly revenue is increasing  implying that protection should
decline with growth in market scale  or decreasing  implying the reverse.
We use two methods of measurement. First, we attempt to measure directly
how total monopoly revenue varies with the private return. We use data we
collectedon thedistributionof bookrevenues; andwe also examineexisting
estimates of the value of patents. Second, the elasticity of total monopoly
revenue has implications for the demand for (skilled) labor: when elastic-
ity is constant or decreasing, the demand for labor increases by more than
the increase in market scale. We examine three sources of data on labor
demand: a time series on copyright; a time series on patents and R&D ex-
penditures; and a cross-section on R&D expenditure across countries. As
we discuss, each of the different sources of data has different caveats asso-
ciated with it  but each supports the notion that elasticity is decreasing and
that protection should optimally decrease with the scale of the market.
We conclude with a policy section, in which we examine the implications
of our estimates for the level and rate of change of optimal IP protection.
Our basic conclusion is that the length of patent and copyright are moving
in the wrong direction, and bear little relation to the social optimum.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3
2. THE MODEL
Ideas are costly to produce, and yield revenues to their creators. Key to
whether a particular idea will be produced is its return  the ratio of rev-
enue to cost of production. Revenue depends on demand  in our analysis
demand changes with the size of the economy: the bigger the economy, the
more demand for any particular idea. Demand also depends on institutional
arrangements: if the creator has a monopoly over his idea he may earn more
revenue than otherwise.
Our notion of equilibrium is that of a patent equilibrium in which there
is a xed common length of patent protection for all ideas. This means that,
in terms of present value of the ow of consumption, a fraction 0  f  1
occurs under monopoly, and a fraction (1 f) occurs under competition;
hence f is the level or the extent of protection. While the patent lasts, the
innovator is a monopolist. Once a patent expires, anyone who wishes to
do so may freely make copies, and price falls to marginal cost with the
innovator earning no further revenue.2 An idea is produced if, given the
patent length f, the prospective monopolist nds it protable to pay the
cost of invention.
The cost of innovation depends on the price of inputs used to produce the
idea  in practice the relevant input is specialized labor, the cost of which is
determined by the wage rate w. Suppose the size of the economy is xed at
one, that the wage rate w = 1 and that the creator has a complete monopoly
over his creation, so that f = 1. Under these conditions, we denote by r the
private return on the creation  the ratio of present value revenue to cost.
If in fact the size of the economy is l, the wage rate is w and the creator
can appropriate only a fraction f of the monopoly revenue, then the return
on the creation is lfr=w. Naturally, the creator will choose to create if and
only if lfr=w  1, that is r  w=lf.
Ideas naturally vary in their private return r. Some very good ideas are
valuable but cost little to produce and so have high values of r; others will
cost a great deal and not yield much revenue, so r will be low. As we have
observed, the ideas that will be produced are those for which the private
return r is at least w=lf. What matters from an economy wide perspec-
tive, then, is the distribution of private returns. It is convenient to think of
this in terms of the amount of labor needed to create ideas. In particular,
we denote by h(r) the total amount of labor input required to produce all
ideas that have private return r in an economy of unit size (l = 1). The
function h(r) is similar to a probability density function, except that, since
it is measured in units of labor, it need not integrate to one. For example, it
2We assume there are no competitive rents after the patent expires; as pointed out in
Boldrin and Levine [1999], inventors generally do earn positive competitive rents.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4
is useful to compute the total amount of labor needed to produce all ideas






which is similar to a cumulative distribution function, except in reverse.
Notice however, that as r ! 0 it may be that H(r) ! ¥; that is, we do not
assume it is necessarily feasible to produce all possible ideas.
The function H(r) is then a measure of total labor input, while aggregate





In other words, M(r) is the sum of monopoly revenue over all ideas with
private value of r, or greater, in an economy of unit size. We assume that
M is differentiable and dene the elasticity of total monopoly revenue, with
respect to variations in the marginal idea, as ¡(r)   rM0(r)=M(r) > 0.
We also make the regularity assumption that ¡(r) is differentiable.
We need also to consider what happens to the number of ideas that are
produced as the economy is scaled up. That is, in the unit economy, pro-
ducing all ideas with private return r requires h(r) units of labor. If an
economy of size l has l times as many ideas with private return r as an
economy of unit size, then this economy would require lh(r) units of labor
as input. More generally, we assume that an economy of size l has g(l)
times as many ideas with private return r as an economy of unit size. To
capture the principle that in a larger population more ideas of a given pri-
vate return are available g(l) is assumed non-decreasing; without loss of
generality we take g(1) = 1.
Our primary interest is in social welfare. To analyze welfare, we need to
relate the social to the private return r on an idea. Our basic hypothesis is
that the two are proportional. That is, under monopoly, we assume that the
social return is nMr, while once the monopoly expires, the social return is
nCr, where nC > nM > 1: The per capita social welfare corresponding to a
particular level of protection f, when all ideas with private return of r and





3. OPTIMAL IP PROTECTION
We rst ask how socially optimal protection  f depends on market size l.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the opportunity cost of skilled labor is con-
stant at w = 1. When  f(l) < 1, in a neighborhood of r = 1=l f(l), the
following holds. (I) ¡0(r) > 0 implies  f(l) is unique and strictly decreas-
ing; (II) ¡0(r) = 0 implies  f(l) is unique and constant; and (III) ¡0(r) < 0
and  f(l) unique3 implies  f(l) is strictly increasing.
The details of the proof are in Appendix 1.
Next we examine the implications of increasing the scale of the market
on the demand for skilled labor. Continuing to hold the wage rate xed at
w = 1, labor demand is given by
LD(l) = g(l)H(1=fl);
from which, letting E denote the elasticity operator, we have
E[LD(l)] = E[g(l)] E[H(r)]:
Depending on which assumptions one makes about g(l), the rst factor
ranges from zero to any large positive number. For example, in the Gross-
man and Lai [2004] setting, g(l) can be identied with aggregate human
capital. To the extent this is constant, E[g(l)]= 0. In models of growth and
innovation due to externalities or increasing returns, such as Grossman and
Helpman [1991, 1994, 1995] or Romer [1990], g(l) is assumed to increase
faster than l, hence E[g(l)] > 1. A benchmark case is that in which each
individual draws her own ideas from the same urn, either with or without
replacement. If sampling is without replacement, and each person draws
the same number of ideas, then g(l) = l and E[g(l)] = 1; if sampling is
with replacement then E[g(l)]  1.
As for the second factor, notice rst that the demand for labor is linked











Notice that when E[g(l)] > 1 z, the elasticity of labor demand is pre-
dicted to be larger than two, hence the elasticity of per capita labor de-
mand is greater than one. More generally, since E[g(l)]  0, we have
3In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satised, so we
must rule out the possibility that  f(l) has multiple values.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6
E[LD(l)=l]> 0. In other words, in the constant elasticity case as the size of
the economy grows, the share of workers in the idea sector grows as well.
The next proposition, proven in Appendix 1, shows how this nding can be
extended from the case of constant elasticity to decreasing elasticity of the
total monopoly revenue.
Proposition3.2. ConsidertwoaggregatemonopolyrevenuefunctionsM1;M2
thathave the samevalue M1(r)=M2(r)andderivative DM1(r)=DM2(r)
(hence, ¡1(r) = ¡2(r)) at r. If D¡1(r0) < D¡2(r0) for r0  r, then
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated







(2) The elasticity of labor demand from M1 is greater than the elasticity
of labor demand from M2, that is E[H1(r)] > E[H2(r)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
In plain words: a revenue function with decreasing elasticity implies an
elasticity of labor supply even larger than that of a constant elasticity rev-
enue function, which we have shown to be at least one in practice. Playing
this backward: should the empirical elasticity of per capita labor supply
with respect to market size be smaller than one, then the associated total
revenue function must display increasing elasticity. Per capita labor in the
idea sector growing faster than the scale of market is consistent with in-
creasing elasticity of total monopoly revenue, because E[g(l)] can be large,
which is independent of the elasticity of monopoly revenue. However, if
per capita labor grows more slowly than the size of the market, we must
rule out both constant and decreasing elasticity.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TOTAL MONOPOLY REVENUE
Up until now we have been thinking of ideas as empty boxes to be lled
in by individuals. From an empirical perspective, it is more useful to think
of each individual being associated with his own ideas and his own oppor-
tunity costs of engaging in innovative activity. We then identify individuals
with their private returns r and think of them as equivalent to the expected
value of their ideas, with the latter being drawn from an underlying distri-
bution µ(r) satisfying the technical restrictions discussed earlier for h(r).
We are interested in the shape of µ(r) as this would allow us to compute the
elasticity of M(r) at the cutoff idea-individual.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7
An issuearises at thispoint. In the availabledata we observerevenuesnot
returns, r. Further, it is hard to observe directly either the opportunity cost,
w, of each inventor or the labor cost of his ideas. Hence we need to assume
that, for all the ideas in the data set, the cost of producing that idea is the
same. This ensures that returns are proportional to revenues. If our data sets
contained ideas produced in very different sectors, this assumption would
be absurd. To avoid this we will try to restrict attention to sets of goods that
are relatively homogeneous, so that it is reasonable to assume that the cost
of creation is roughly constant within each set.
A second issue also arises when going to the data. The theory assumes
we observe returns ex ante, when the decision to pursue the idea is made.
But at the time the decision to pursue the idea is made, the revenue will
generally be uncertain, and we only observe its ex post realization. Suppose
that there are two outcomes, a favorable outcome yielding a return of R with
probability p and an unfavorable one yielding no return. Then r = pR. As
long as p does not depend on R, using R in place of r will overestimate
revenues but will correctly compute elasticities.
Revenue from Authorship of Fiction Books. We now examine a partic-
ular category of creative individuals: authors of ction books. Ideally one
wouldlike to observe revenues for variousbooks for each author, to account
for the possible ex ante uncertainty about ex post sales. Such data are not
available, hence we proceed with what is. Although we do not have data
on lifetime income of individual authors, we do have data on the revenue
generated by individual book sales. We ignore the fact that it is costly to
produce books once they are written, which is irrelevant to our ends insofar
as the cost of producing each copy of a book is independent of the number
of copies produced and sold. In summary, our assumptions are
 The opportunity cost of writing books is constant.
 Expectedrevenuesfromthesaleofasuccessfulbookareperfectly
anticipated, and the probability of failure does not depend upon the
private return.
 Themarginalcost ofproducingbooksissmallrelativetosalesprice.
Then income per unit of time taken to produce a book is r = lfr and,
given current copyright laws, one can safely set f = 1 in what follows. We
can compute the aggregate income of all authors who earn at least a given
amount, Mr(r), and of course M(r) = (1=l)Mr(r=l) has the same elas-
ticity. We gathered data on revenues for ction books published in March
and September of 2003 and 2004, respectively; our samples range between
1,200 and 1,300 books for each of these four months. The details of the data
collection procedure can be found in Appendix 2. Figure 4.2 shows M(r)
computed on the basis of the September 2003 data. Figure 4.3 shows a plotGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8
FIGURE 4.1. _
FIGURE 4.2. Logarithmic Book Revenue (Fiction)  Sept. 2003
on logarithmic axes, including a close-up to illustrate more clearly the in-
creasing nature of the elasticity on both ordinary and logarithmic axes. The
data for the other months, notreported but available, yield extremelysimilar
results.
Four comments are in order. First, for less successful books the M(r)
function is nearly linear, and overall the function exhibits increasing elas-
ticity  a fact that can be seen more clearly in the logarithmic plots. Sec-
ond, the actual elasticity ¡ ranges from zero when r = 0 to ¡ = 0:1 when
r = 5000  which is a plausible value for books that are not mere vanity
press items  to about ¡ = 0:3 for the higher values of r. The third feature
of the data is the discontinuity between roughly $150,000 and $300,000 inGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9
revenue.4 This is broadly consistent with other data on books revenues:
Leibowitz and Margolis [2003] report that less than 200 out of 25,000 titles
account for roughly two-thirds of all book revenues. This is considerably
more concentrated than we nd in our data  but certainly reects a strong
discontinuity. These books appear to be predominately by big name au-
thors, who are largely irrelevant for optimal copyright policy: the relevant
part of the M(r) function is the part near the cutoff  that is, for marginal,
not inframarginal, books. The fourth fact is how small the xed cost wh(r)
may be for writing and publishing ction; in September 2003, 1,181 books,
out of a total of 1,223, earned $50,000 or less  corresponding to total rev-
enue of approximately $300,000. These books accounted for 50% of total
revenue, that is, $6M out of $12M. The numbers for the other months are
similar. In the same data, 984 books earned less than $10,000; hence our es-
timateof the marginalauthor'sopportunitycost shouldbe placed at $60,000
or less.
Patent Values. A similar analysis of the value of patents is possible  with
the reservation that it is less likely for patents that ex post value can be an-
ticipated ex ante. If we disaggregate by industry, it is at least plausible that
the xed cost of the innovation is not systematically related to the realized
revenues. We use the value of patents estimated by Lanjouw [1993] for four
German industries on the basis of patent renewal rates and data on the cost
of renewal. We graph the corresponding M(r)curves in Figure 4.4. As can
be seen, in no case are the tails similar to that of a Pareto distribution  the
curves fall far too close to zero. Numerical estimates can be found in Fig-
ure 4.5. This reports for each industry and for increasing values of r, the
elasticities evaluated at the midpoint of each segment of the linear spline.
The number in square brackets is the corresponding value of  rM0
i(r).
With the exception of the highest category of r for computers, elastic-
ities are increasing everywhere. The values of  rM0
i(r) are also relevant
because the same f applies across sectors. Hence the aggregate distribution
is M(r) = åiMi(r), where i indexes industries. Unfortunately, the fact that
each Mi(r) function has increasing elasticity does not imply that this is true
for M(r). However, if M0
i(r) is increasing, then the corresponding elasticity
is increasing as well, and increasing  rM0
i(r) is a condition that does ag-
gregate. While not always increasing,  rM0
i(r) is increasing in the relevant
range, that is, at lower values of r, for all i. This implies the elasticity of
M(r) is also increasing, at least for values of r near the threshold, which is
what matters.
4The sales data are from a single distributor, Ingram, constituting about one-sixth of the
book market, so total revenues would be about six times this number.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10
FIGURE 4.3. _
FIGURE 4.4. Elasticities
Computers Pharmaceuticals Textiles Engines
.22 [.17] .14 [.12] .19 [.15] .32 [.23]
.74 [.40] .53 [.33] .66 [.38] .95 [.45]
.93 [.30] .75 [.30] .88 [.31] 1.12 [.32]
3.76 [.60] 2.35 [.48] 2.42 [.44] 3.04 [.42]
2.73 [.12] 2.81 [.16] 3.02 [.14] 3.37 [.12]
Our ndings for patents appear to accord well with the existing empir-
ical literature. To name but a few recent studies, Harhoff, Scherer, and
Vopel (1997) use a data set of full-term patents applied for in 1977 and held
by West German and U.S. residents. They compare the ability of various
empirical distributions, including the Pareto, to t the data and nd that a
two-parameter lognormal distribution provides the best t. Silverberg and
Verspagen (2004) use a variety of different data sources from both Europe
and the U.S.A. and two different measures of r (citations and monetary val-
ues). They nd that, while the overall distributions are well approximated
by exponential ones, it is the upper tail that is better captured by a Pareto
distribution. Asourconcern hereiswiththeshapeoftheµ(r)near thelower
cutoff value, this is supportive of our claim. The econometric literature on
the value of patents, stemming from the paper of Pakes [1986] (see Hall,
Jaffe, and Tratjenberg [2004] for a recent update and new results), seems to
almost unanimously nd that the appropriate distribution is a log-normal orGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11
FIGURE 5.1. _
an exponential, for both of which the elasticity of the total revenue function
is increasing.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LABOR DEMAND
As we have seen, there is a close connection between the elasticity of
total monopoly revenue and labor demanded by the ideas sector. Here we
exploitthisrelationshipto get a secondsource of informationabout whether
the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing or decreasing.
Copyright Time Series. First we apply our analysis of labor demand to a
time series of U.S. copyright. Here we must assume that the distribution
M(r) is time invariant, and that f is either constant or increasing over time
 as in fact it is. We measure the scale of the market by the size of the
literate population,5 and the amount of labor in the sector by the number of
copyright registrations. The relevant annual growth rates for the U.S. are
reported, by decade, in Figure 5.1. If elasticity of total monopoly revenue
is constant or decreasing, we expect to see per capita copyright growing
more rapidly than population. This is in fact the case prior to 1900 and for
1970-80, but those are both anomalous periods. For the pre-1900 period
one must notice that copyright registration only begins in 1870, so the huge
initialincrease in registrationsis unlikelyto reect a correspondingincrease
in the actual output of literary works. In particular, it is important to realize
that in 1891 it became possible for foreign authors to get U.S. copyrights
5Theliteracyadjustmentmakeslittle difference;in 1870whenthecopyrightregistration
data begin, the literacy rate is already 80%, climbing to 92.3% by 1910.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12
for the rst time.6 Similarly, in 1972 it became possible to copyright musi-
cal recordings other than phono records  previously such recordings were
protected under other parts of the law. In 2000, 6.8% of new copyrights
were for sound recordings, so it is not surprising that copyright registra-
tions jumped up 1972. In 1976, the term of copyright, which since 1909
had been 28 years, plus a renewal term of 28 years, was increased to the
life of the author plus 50 years. In 1988 the United States eliminated the re-
quirement of registering a copyright, so after that time, there is no reason to
think of copyright registrations as a particularly good measure of the output
of literary works.
What all this means is that we should focus on the period between the
major copyright acts of 1909 and 1972. Here we nd that overall the lit-
erate population grew by 92%, while the number of copyright registrations
grew by only 12%. Moreover, the literate population grew faster than the
per capita copyright registrations in every decade, although in 1920-1930
and 1960-1970 the two growth rates are very similar. This is especially
dramatic because as we noted above, there was considerable technological
change during the period, with entirely new areas such as movies, recorded
music, radio, and television opening up: by 2000 only 48% of new copy-
right registrations were for literary works, while in 1909 literary works ac-
counted for the bulk of copyright registrations. Further, while the number
of copyright registrations in the U.S.A. overestimates the share of the U.S.
per capita labor dedicated to literary work, the size of the literate population
grossly underestimates the size of the relevant market. The rst is because a
large number of foreign writers register their work in the U.S.A., the second
because the growth of per capita income and, especially, the expansion of
American culture around the world greatly increased the potential market
size.
Patent Time Series. We next turn to the demand for labor used to produce
patentable ideas. One issue that arises is whether we should measure the
scale of market l by population or by GDP. Increases in per capita GDP in-
crease the scaleof the market, buttheyincrease theopportunitycostof labor
in the non-idea sector (working with existingideas) by the same proportion,
so increases in GDP have an ambiguous impact on the effective scale of the
market. On the other hand, increased productivity in the non-idea sector
may also be reected in increased productivity in the idea sector: double
the per capita income may mean twice as many ideas per capita, or half the
labor time required before to implement a new idea. For these reasons we
6A brief history of U.S. copyright can be found at U.S. Copyright Ofce [2001a]. The
1972 change is described in U.S. Copyright Ofce [2001b].GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13
FIGURE 5.2. _
will focus on population as a more conservative measure of l in time se-
ries data, where per capita GDP is increasing. In the cross section we will
examine both population and GDP as measures of scale of market.
Figure 5.2 is the patent analog of Figure 5.1 and is quite similar. Whether
we measure patentable activity by patents awarded or by patent applica-
tions, from 1890 to 1980 the growth rate of per capita patents exceeds the
growth rate of population in only two decades, 1900-1910 and 1960-1970,
and in both cases by only a trivial amount. In other decades, the growth rate
of patents per capita is much lower than population growth, in some cases
even negative. Overall, from 1890 to 1980 population grew at a rate of
1.4% per year and per capita patents at 0.1% per year. Before 1890 patents
per capita grew considerably faster than population, with a large drop in
patents from 1860 to 1870 most likely because the reform of the patent law
and patent ofce in 1861 made it considerably more difcult to get a patent.
In the opposite direction, in the period after 1980 it became much easier
to get and enforce a patent  the landmark event in this period being the
creation, in 1982, of a special federal court to try patent cases. In summary,
the time series of patents lead us to the same conclusions we reached with
copyright: thatpatents havegrownless than marketsize, thereby suggesting
that the elasticity of monopoly revenue is increasing also in this case.
An alternative to measuring either patent applications or awards is to use
R&D expenditure as a proxy for the amount of labor used in creating new
ideas. R&D expenditure, while in principle a better measure of input than
patents, has a number of its own problems. First, the concept of R&D
expenditure is fairly fuzzy and available only for relatively recent years 
the major source of data being an NSF survey conducted since 1953. The
denition used by the NSF is creative work undertaken on a systematic
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge ofGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 14
man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise
new applications. Firms and government agencies are surveyed and asked
to report how much they spend on this activity.
The picture of R&D expenditure as measured by the NSF is ambiguous
and yet different from that of the number of patents  ambiguous because
the choice of which measure of R&D expenditure one should consider is
not obvious. One possibility is to focus on the private sector only. How-
ever, we would expect that research nanced by the federal government 
much of which is carried out at private institutions  both produces useful
ideas and increases the demand for skilled labor. On the other hand, there
are reasons to believe that the federal expenditure in R&D reacts much less,
or maybe not at all, to market incentives and to the expected protability
of innovations in particular.7 Universities, either public or private, are ob-
viously producing ideas and employing skilled workers, but the extent to
which they respond to market incentives may have varied substantially dur-
ing the last fty years. In the light of this, we will report statistics for four
aggregates: total, private sector plus universities, and these same two series
adjusted for the wage rate of college and post-college workers. The latter
are relevant because the wage skill premium increased dramatically during
the last thirty years, and workers involved in R&D activities hold college,
and most often post-college, degrees.
The ratio of total R&D expenditure to GDP has grown from 1:36% in
1953 to 2:78% in 2002, thereby doubling in fty years. During the same
time, population has grown about 80% and real GDP has almost quintu-
pled. It may be worth noticing that the maximum value for the total R&D
expenditure to GDP ratio, 2:88%, was reached in 1964. For the private plus
universities aggregate, the same ratio has more than tripled between 1953
and 2002, going from 0:63% to 2:0%. Next, assume that the cost of labor
employed in the idea sector grows, roughly, at one-half the college wage
and one-half the post-college wage.8 Then the cost of the average worker
in the idea sector between 1963 and 2002, the period for which data are
available, has grown by about 95%, while over the same period, the mean
wage has grown by about 65%.9 Between 1963 and 2002, the ratio of to-
tal R&D expenditure to GDP basically does not move, while the industry
7This point is made by Jones [2004] while analyzing the R&D data and the patent
puzzle. However, we would expect some scale of market effect on federal R&D expen-
diture as well  as the scale of the market increases so does the tax base that pays for the
expenditures.
8This is arbitrary but not unreasonable.
9High school graduate wages grew 20%, college graduate wages grew by 65%, and
post-college graduate wages grew at 123%; see Eckstein and Nagypal [2004], Figures 1
and 3.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15
plus universities ratio goes from 0:9% to 2:0%. That is, the industry plus
university ratio grows by 110%, population grows by 52%, and total GDP
by 70%. Because our index of the relative wages in the idea sector has
grown roughly 20% over the same period, it turns out that, if one uses to-
tal expenditure in R&D, then the share of workers in the idea sector has
actually declined, implying a strongly increasing elasticity of M(r); if, in-
stead, one uses the private plus universities measure, it has grown by about
90%. The latter is somewhat higher than either the population or the GDP
growth rates; hence, on the basis of the last index, one cannot rule out the
hypothesis that the elasticity of the total revenue function is either constant
or decreasing.10
R&D Cross Section. Finally, we look at a cross section of countries. Here
we run a simple cross-country regression with R&D as a fraction of GDP
as the dependent variable and market size and the strength of IP protection
as explanatory variables.11 We initially assume that the domestic market
is what is signicant. If ` represents per capita labor effort in the ideas
sector and we assume constant elasticity of labor demand with respect to
market size, we can write log` = Jlog(fl). To account for the effect of
both population and per capita GDP on market size, write l = yaN, where
N is population and y is per capita GDP.12 Ordinary least squares regres-
sion gives J = 0:20(0:03) and aJ = :56(0:038), meaning that a = 2:8, a
remarkably large number that, if applied to the previous time series analy-
sis would imply a strongly increasing elasticity.13 The estimated elasticity
with respect to l is nowhere close to unity. However, this assumes that
the relevant market for R&D is the domestic market. More generally, we
would measure l = ldomestic+lworld, where lworld is the fraction of world
GDP availableas a market for domesticR&D. Since regressinglog R&D on
l gives essentially the same result as regressing on ldomestic=laverage, and
regressing on log(ldomestic+lworld) gives essentially the same result as re-
gressing on ldomestic=lworld, the regression coefcient should be multiplied
by lworld=laverage. Thus, if the ratio of revenue earned on R&D in foreign
10An endless list of additional caveats should be added. The tax and accounting treat-
ments of R&D have changed substantially over the period, favoring the relabeling of many
sources of cost as R&D expenditure. The Cold War, and the changing federal policies
toward basic research also add additional uncertainty to the interpretation of the data.
11To measure the latter we use an index developed by Walter Park, to whom we are
grateful for providing us with his data. Details of the construction can be found in Park
and Lippholdt [2003].
12Standard errors in parentheses, R2 = 0:65.
13The underlyingdata include 34 countries for the period 1980-1997,and can be found
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markets to domestic markets were on the order of 5, it would be possible
for the elasticity of per capita R&D with respect to size of market to be
near unitary. However, a ratio of 5 is implausibly large for most countries
with the exception, possibly, of Switzerland and Luxembourg. Exports are
almost everywhere a fraction, not a multiple of GDP. Consequently, a ratio
of 5 would be possible only if R&D were much more intensive in export
industries than the average  by a factor larger than 5. Using Lo's [2003]
detailed data from Taiwan, in 1991 export intensive industries spent about
1.8 times as much on R&D as domestic-oriented industries. Using micro-
data on renewal rates to estimate the value of patents Lanjouw, Pakes. and
Putnam[1998]nd thehighestvalueoftheimplicitsubsidyfrompatenting
abroad at 35% for the U.K. and Germany, with most countries receiving
15-20% of income from a patent from rights held abroad. So the evidence
easily contradicts the idea that lworld=laverage is on the order of 5.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR IP
What consequencesdoes ouranalysishavefor the optimalIP policy? The
rst set of calculations indicates that IP protection for patents is probably
too high, but this conclusion is somewhat tentative. In the case of copyright,
in stead, it seems conclusive that copyright terms are far too long. The
second set of calculations strongly indicates that the scale of market effect
is quantitatively signicant and that there should be substantial reductions
in the length of IP term in response to size of market increases.
To turn this into operational policy prescriptions, the rst step is to trans-
late f  our measure of effective IP protection  into the relevant policy
parameter - the length of patent and copyright term. This depends on the
interest rate and on depreciation.
Length of Term, Depreciation, and Effective Protection. Suppose that
the real interest rate is r, that all ideas depreciate at a common rate d and
that the length of term is T. Then  with perfect enforcement  the effective
protection is f=1 e (r+d)T. Reasonable estimates of the real interest rate
lie between 2% and 4%. Since the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, copyright protection in the U.S. is life of the author plus 70
years, or 90 years for works without an author. If we take the remaining
life of an author to be roughly 35 years, this would mean 105 years of
protection.14 CurrentpatentlengthintheU.S.forutilitypatents(inventions)
is 20 years.
14Akerloff et al. [2002] use an estimate of 30 additional years of life and a 7% real
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FIGURE 6.1. Effective Copyright Protection








Depreciation rates are more difcult. In our data for books published in
September 2003, revenues accrued during the four months of 2003 were 2.4
times those during the 10 months of 2004; meaning that per month sales fell
by a factor of 6 over about one-third of a year, or an annual depreciation rate
of nearly 95%.15 Capital goods depreciation rates are generally thought to
be close to 8% per year, including housing and building, which depreciate
more slowly. Little data are available about the depreciation rate of ideas so,
insofar as ideas correspond to capital vintages, they may well depreciate at
the same rate; some very good ideas (the law of gravity) may not depreciate
at all.
If theowof salesisconstantovertime, for acopyrightlengthofT =105
years, and different interest rates r and depreciation rates d, the correspond-
ing values of f = 1 e (r+d)T are given in Figure 6.1.
The low values 0.02, 0.03, 0.04 for r+d correspond to no depreciation;
theintermediatevalues0.07, 0.08, 0.09correspondtoa modestdepreciation
rate of5%; we donotreport anyvalueslarger than 0.38(thatis, depreciation
between 34% and 36%) since, even with just a 20-year term, f = 1 at this
point. In summary, for realistic interest and depreciation rates, the current
copyright term certainly corresponds to f = 1 in our model, while current
patent terms correspond to roughly f = 0:9.
Calibration of Demand. To analyze the optimal level of protection, we
need to know nC and nM, besides ¡. A useful benchmark case is that of
linear demand and constant marginal cost so that nC = 2 and nM = 3=2.
But, is linear demand empirically relevant?
Take rst the case of a small cost-saving innovation  for example, a way
of making a machine work a little better. This is the type of thing most
people think of when they think of an invention, although only a small
15This is consistent with data for the other months and with the general claim that the
most signicant book sales occur within three months of publication.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18
fraction of patents are of this type. Demand for a small cost-saving innova-
tion is equal to the per machine cost saved up to the number of machines 
then dropsto zero. Since the innovationis smallit has an insignicanteffect
on the number of machines. On the other hand, this is also the case in which
the innovation is usually "embodied" in some tool or machine-part, which
is costly to be produced and cannot be easily imitated; said differently: this
is the case the standard model is most incapable of capturing, and in which
the Boldrin and Levine [1999] analysis applies best. Assuming away these
concerns, we then conclude that, to a good approximation, nC = nM = 1 in
this case, since we have normalized so that the monopoly prot is 1. When
this applies, the elasticity of total monopoly revenue does not really matter
as there is no deadweight loss in moving from competition to monopoly:
the social optimum is to set f = 1, and it does not change in response to the
scale of market.
More generally, it is easy to see that if demand is concave, then nM and
nC  nM are smaller than in the linear case  the extreme case being that
of a small cost-saving innovation  while if demand is convex then nM, and
nC nM are larger than in the linear case. Notice that larger nM and nC nM
increase thescale of marketeffect, buthavean ambiguouseffect onthe level
of IP: larger nM tending to increase and larger nC  nM tending to decrease
optimal IP.
In understandinghowgoodthebenchmarklinearcase is, itisimportantto
recognize that demand for most innovations is strongly affected by income.
Take the case of new drugs: it is probably a good approximation to think of
willingness to pay as proportional to individual income. From 2001 census
data for the U.S., assuming that each individual demands one unit of an
innovation,withwillingnesstopayproportionaltoincome, we constructthe
demand curve shown in Figure 6.3. In other words, demand based on linear
Engel's curves is, to a good approximation, linear. Artistic creations such
as books, movies, and music are similar to drugs in that demand is heavily
dependent on income. In fact drugs and artistic creations are undoubtedly
superiorgoods, meaningthat the fraction of income spent on themincreases
as income goes up.
If we start with linear demand and assume linear Engel's curves, then
goods that are strongly superior, in the sense that the fraction of income
spent on them rises at an increasing rate, have convex demand curves. Con-
versely for goods that are strongly inferior  orphan drugs are a likely ex-
ample  demand will be concave.
The conclusion is that for most types of goods, the linear demand ap-
proximation is conservative  most likely overstating the level of optimal
IP protection and understating the optimal rate of decrease in response toGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 19
FIGURE 6.2. Demand Proportional to Income
U.S. Income Distribution 2001
Source: U.S. Census
market size. The exception is in the case of small cost-saving innovations
that are completely disembodied and imitable  which to a certain extent
matches the idea of process rather than product patents in patent law.
Historically, process patents  patents on methods for doing things  have
received stronger protection than product patents. The theory indicates
that this is, in fact, the right approach. Unfortunately, despite the great
historical success  for example, in the development of the chemical indus-
try  of allowing only process patents in countries such as Germany, the
Anglo-French system of allowingproducts the same protection as processes
has become now widespread.
The Static Optimum. To determine the optimal level of protection we can











In Figure 6.2 we report (second column) the optimal values of  f corre-
sponding to elasticities ¡ in the range 0.03 ot 0.40. Notice that the rele-
vant elasticities correspond to the cutoff value of r which, strictly speaking,
should be the lowest value seen in the data. In the copyright data the elas-
ticity falls as low as zero, but the lower values of r clearly correspond to
vanity press items. The lowest cutoff that is plausible for a prot maximiz-
ing work is around r = 2000 which gives an elasticy of 0.03. In the patent
data, the cutoff values of r correspond to the rst row of Table 4.4. The
highest value there is 0.32 corresponding to Engines. So we view the range
0.03 to 0.40 as the empirically relevant range. The third to fth columnsGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20
FIGURE 6.3. Optimal Protection and Term Length
¡  f r+d = 0:2 r+d = 0:4 r+d = 0:08
0.03 0.13 7 4 2
0.10 0.24 14 7 4
0.15 0.33 20 10 5
0.20 0.40 26 13 7
0.30 0.51 36 18 9
0.40 0.60 46 23 12
translate the optimal  f in lengths of term, using different interest and depre-
ciation rates.
Two facts stand out. First, optimal level of protection  f is less than 1
 meaning that, given that elasticity is increasing, optimal copyright and
patent protectionshouldstrictlydecline with the size of the market. Second,
in the case of copyright, the optimal length is much less than the actual
length; since the actual cutoff value of r in the data is quite small, even an
elasticity of 0.05 may be a tremendous overestimate of the actual elasticity
on the margin. Certainly it is hard to justify as few as 7 years of copyright
based on this data; if we consider depreciation  not in the empirical range
of 95%, but say in the range of 5%  copyright protection should be at
most several years. This is generally consistent with our scale of market
calculations below under the hypothesis that 28 years at the start of the 20th
century was about right.
In the case of patents, estimated elasticities appeared somewhat larger,
with .15 being the smallest sensible estimate. With a real interest rate plus
depreciation rate of 4%, this implies an optimal patent length of 10 years,
while with a more realistic depreciation adjustment it would be closer to
5 years  again, not so terribly different than what we would get if we
assumed term length were correct at the beginning of the twentieth century
and imputed the increase in market size. If we took the high end elasticity
of .4 and a real interest rate of just 2%, the optimal term would be 46 years;
hence it is not impossible, at least in principle, to reconcile existing patent
term with available data. Realistic estimates, though, suggest that optimal
patent term should be between 5 and 10 years.
The Scale of Market Effect. To examine the scale of market effect, we
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To get a feeling for this, note that in the simple and empirically relevant
case that M(r) is linear E¡ = 1+¡. Consequently Ef(l) is  1=2 or less
negative depending on nC  nM. When demand is linear, nC  nM = 1=2,
andEf(l)= 1=4. Thismeansthata10%increase insize ofmarketshould
reduce effective protection by 2.5%. For example, if the world economy is
growing at 4% per year, then a simple rule of thumb would be to reduce
protection by about 1% per year. In the case of 20-year patents that would
mean about two months each year. One implication of this is that during the
last century in which world GDP grew by a factor of roughly 40, optimal
protection should have declined from 20 years to about 1 year.
A paradigmatic case is that of popular music. Forty years ago, at the
time of Elvis Presley and the Beatles, new recordings selling a million units
wereconsideredexceptionalsuccessesandawardedgoldenrecords, while
in the current times a successful record sells easily ten or twenty million
copies. The effective size of the market has, therefore, increased at least a
factor of ten. At the same time, advances in recording and digital technolo-
gies have reduced the xed cost required to produce a new record to about
one-fth of its earlier level. This suggests that the socially optimal length
of copyright protection should have dropped by about a factor of twelve.
Unfortunately, in the case of copyright, terms have been moving in the op-
posite direction; copyright terms have grown by a factor of about four since
early in the twentieth century. This means that, at least for recorded music,
they currently are on the order of a hundred times longer than they should
be. A similar calculation can be performed for books and movies. Consider
the fact that, since the beginning of the past century, world GDP has grown
by nearly two orders of magnitude. It is reasonable to argue that the size of
the market for books and movies must have grown at least as much because
literacy has surged, and the availability of playing devices has increased
more than proportionally due to the dramatic drop in their relative prices.
Hence, if the copyright term of 28 years at the beginning of the 20th century
was socially optimal, the current term should be a little over a year, rather
than the current term of approximately 100 years. This gives a ratio of 100
between the actual copyright terms and their socially optimal value.
7. CONCLUSION
For the rst time, to the best of our knowledge, since the path-breaking
work of Nordhaus [1969], we merge established theory of IP protection
with available data on the value of innovations to quantify the socially opti-
mal term of IP protection, and its relation with market size. Among existing
models, we use the one in which IP has the potentially highest social value;
hence our calculations are likely to over-estimate the optimal length of IPGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 22
protection. We draw information from a wide variety of independent em-
pirical sources, both time-series and cross section, to calibrate the model,
and always reach the same set of policy conclusions.
 The elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing, hence the
term of IP protection should decrease over time as the market size
increases. Our best estimate, given the historical growth rate of
market size, is that IP protection terms should decrease of about
two months per year.
 Current copyright and patent terms are equivalent to complete mo-
nopoly protection for the full economic life of new goods, and are
dramatically higher than optimal ones, sometime by two orders of
magnitude.
 On the basis of the available evidence, our best estimate of the
length of optimal copyright term is about two years, and that of
patents is about ten years.
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proposition. 3.1. Suppose that the opportunity cost of skilled labor is con-
stant at w = 1. When  f(l) < 1, in a neighborhood of r = 1=l f(l), the
following three cases hold. (I) ¡0(r) > 0 implies  f(l) is unique and strictly
decreasing; (II) ¡0(r) = 0 implies  f(l) is unique and constant; and (III)
¡0(r) < 0 and  f(l) unique16 implies  f(l) is strictly increasing.
16In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satised, so we
must rule out the possibility that  f(l) has multiple values.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24
Proof. Divide welfare W by lg(l), then differentiate it with respect to f to






















has the same qualitative properties as FOC(l;f): it has the same zeros, the
same sign on the boundary, and NOCf(l;f) < 0 is sufcient for a zero to
be a local maximum.
We next differentiate with respect to f to nd the second order condition














The second term is unambiguously negative. The rst term has two fac-




  1 representing so-
cial surplus of the marginal idea produced; since privately it yields zero
prot, it must yield positive social surplus. If the other factor ¡0(1=lf) >
0 then there is a unique solution to the social optimization problem; if
NOC(l;1)  0, then that solution is  f(l) = 1; otherwise it is the unique
solution to the rst order condition NOC(l;f) = 0.
















which has the opposite sign to ¡0(1=lf): 
Proposition. 3.2. Considertwodifferentaggregatemonopolyrevenue func-
tionsM1;M2 thathavethesamevalueM1(r)=M2(r)andderivativeDM1(r)=
DM2(r) (hence, elasticity ¡1(r) = ¡2(r)) at r. If D¡1(r0) < D¡2(r0) for
r0  r, thenGROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 25
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated







(2) The elasticity of labor demand associated to M1 is greater than the
elasticity of labor demand from M2; that is, E[H1(r)] > E[H2(r)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
Proof. Step 1: M1(r0) > M2(r0)
Here and in what follows, r0  r holds. Then, D¡1(r) D¡2(r) < 0 by
assumption. Moreover





so D2M2(r) D2M1(r) = (M(r)=r)[D¡1(r) D¡2(r)] < 0, where M(r)
is the common value of M1 and M2 at r. Then, for r0 near r we have
M1(r0) M2(r0)  (1=2)[D2M1(r) D2M2(r)](r0 r)2 > 0
Moreover,ifM1(r00) M2(r00)<0forsomelarger r00, thenM1(r0) M2(r0)=
0 for some r00 > r0 > r, since both functions are continuous. Let  r0 be
the smallest such r0, that is, the rst point to the right of r where M1
and M2 cross. Then ¡( r0) =  r0DM( r0)=M( r0) and the assumption that
¡1( r0) < ¡2( r0) imply DM1( r0) > DM2( r0), that is, M1 crosses M2 from












































E[H1(r)] and E[H2(r)] have the same numerator, and, because of Step 2,
the rst has a smaller denominator. Hence the conclusion. 
APPENDIX 2: DATA
Book Revenue. We collected all the titles, ISBN numbers, and sale prices
listed by www.amazon.com for the query hardcover ction books and for
the four publication periods of March and September 2003 and 2004. The
sales data are from the Ingram stock statistics, automatic telephone line at
615-213-6803. The Ingram stock statistics system gives the following sta-
tistics for each ISBN number punched in: Total sales this year, Total
sales last year, Total current unadjusted demand, Total last week de-
mand. Total revenue for each book is calculated using the total sales data
fromIngramandtheNovember2004salespricelistedonwww.amazon.com.
Ingramisa largebookdistributor,andgenerallythoughtto generateroughly
one-sixth of all book sales. It should be noted that the sales prices on
www.amazon.com are changing over time, most often decreasing, so we
might have underestimated the revenue during the rst year for books pub-
lished during September 2003. Because of the large number of observa-
tions, we do not reproduce the data here, but it is available from
http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Copyright Time Series. The basic source of the copyright registration
time series is from the annual report of the copyright ofce from 2000,
which can be found at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2000/appendices.pdf. Thisalsoin-
cludes the breakdown of registrations by type for 2000. Population data for
1901-1999 is from the U.S. Census
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt;dataprior
to 1901 is from http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf;
the two sources have a slight discrepancy for the 1900 population with the
formersourcereporting76,094,000andthelatter(whichweused)76,212,168.
The year 2000 data was from the 2000 Census. Literacy rates are from
http://www.arthurhu.com/index/literacy.htm. Thedatawe usedcanbefound
at http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27
Patent Time Series. R&D Expenditures by Sectors: National Patterns of
R&D Resources: 2002 Data Update, Table D, National Science Founda-
tion GDP: National Income and Production Account, Table 1.1.5, Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Population: 1953-1959: Population Estimates Pro-
gram, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, release date: April 2000
1960-2002: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of U.S., 2004-2005.